Vindicating Civil Rights in Changing Times by Days, Drew S, III
The Yale Law Journal
Vindicating Civil Rights in Changing
Times
Drew S. Days, MIt
I have been asked to give a general overview of the Justice Depart-
ment's work and policies as they have developed over the past thirty years.
I intend to do that. But first I would like to go back more than thirty
years-more than fifty years, in fact-to a century ago, 1883, to make a
brief but important point. One hundred and one years ago, the Solicitor
General of the United States stood before the Supreme Court and argued
that black citizens had a constitutional right to the enjoyment of public
accommodations on an equal basis with whites. Those arguments were
rejected by the Court in its tragic decision in the Civil Rights Cases,1 a
result that was not rectified until Congress passed the public accommoda-
tions provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 So the government of the
United States and the Justice Department are not new to the job of seek-
ing full protection of the laws for blacks and other minorities. During the
last one hundred years, despite fits and starts, troughs and peaks, the fed-
eral government's finest hours in my estimation have been those when it
stood, like Solicitor General Phillips in 1883, unequivocally on the side of
efforts to rid this country of its shameful legacy of racism and other forms
of discrimination.
Let me stop once more on the way to 1957, at a time almost fifty years
ago, when the Justice Department once again made clear where it stood
on civil rights and the protection of blacks from discrimination. On Febru-
ary 3, 1939, Attorney General Frank Murphy issued an order creating a
civil liberties unit within the criminal division of the Department of Jus-
tice. In setting into motion a process that resulted in the creation of the
Civil Rights Division nearly twenty years later, Attorney General Mur-
phy said:
In a democracy, an important function of the law enforcement
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale University. The author was Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights from 977 to 1980.
An earlier version of this comment was presented at the annual Civil Rights Institute of the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., on May 20, 1983.
1. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). A summary of the Solicitor General's argument appears in id. at 5-7.
2. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 201-207, 78 Stat. 241, 243-46 (1964) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000a (1976)).
Vol. 93: 983, 1984
Brown Anniversary
branch of government is the aggressive protection of fundamental
rights inherent in a free people.
In America these guarantees are contained in express provisions of
the Constitution and in acts of Congress. It is the purpose of the
Department of Justice to pursue a program of vigilant action in the
prosecution of infringement of these rights.'
Murphy's view that the Department of Justice is responsible for "aggres-
sive protection" of fundamental rights has, at least since 1939, served as
the standard against which civil rights enforcement programs of subse-
quent administrations have appropriately been judged.
The Civil Rights Division as we know it was established as part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1957,' the first civil rights legislation since Recon-
struction. For the next six years, its litigation efforts were directed prima-
rily against voting discrimination and violations of criminal civil rights
laws.5 The Civil Rights Act of 19646 greatly expanded the Division's au-
thority to combat racial, ethnic, and, in certain instances, gender-based
discrimination by private employers and recipients of federal financial as-
sistance, and in public schools, accommodations, and facilities. Expansion
of the Attorney General's authority to enforce civil rights laws in new
areas has continued steadily since 1964, with passage of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965;7 the Civil Rights Act of 1968,8 which is known for its fair
housing provisions; the Education Amendments of 1972;" and even some-
thing called the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975,10 which
ensures that American citizens living abroad can vote in national elections.
3. R. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD 1 (1947).
4. Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957); see Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., Order
No. 155-57 (Dec. 9, 1957) (establishing Civil Rights Division).
5. The Division's annual reports during this period reflect the relatively narrow scope of its activ-
ities. The Division's only specialized "antidiscrimination" section (it also had responsibility for pris-
oners in federal custody, election fraud, and Hatch Act enforcement) was concerned with voting. With
the exception of criminal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, this was really the only area
in which the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 empowered the Division to initiate suits. The Divi-
sion's role in school desegregation cases was limited to ensuring that federal court decrees were en-
forced and to participating as an amicus curiae in privately initiated actions, since it had no indepen-
dent authority to bring suit. See 1962 Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 168-70.
6. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000h
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
7. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). The Act was amended, strengthened, and extended
by the Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314; the Voting Rights
Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400; and the Voting Rights Act Amendments
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131. The Act and its amendments are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
1971, 1973-1973bb (1976 & West Supp. 1983).
8. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631
(1976)).
9. Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(a), 86 Stat. 235, 375 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1976)).
10. Pub. L. No. 94-203, 89 Stat. 1142 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973dd (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)).
The Yale Law Journal
More recently, the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980"
has given the Division a major new responsibility-vindicating the rights
of the mentally ill, the mentally retarded, prisoners, juvenile offenders,
and the aged not to be subjected to inhumane and degrading conditions of
confinement.
The Civil Rights Division is the federal government's chief agency for
enforcing civil rights laws in the courts.' 2 During the 1960's, its litigation
efforts were directed primarily at combating blatant forms of racial dis-
crimination against, and intimidation of, blacks. While these problems
have not disappeared entirely, they were certainly more flagrant during
the 1960's than they currently are. Early employment cases involved such
issues as segregated lines of progression, and discrimination in hiring.
13
Public accommodations cases sought to eliminate segregated motels, res-
taurants, and restrooms.' 4 And school desegregation cases addressed the
problems faced by students and faculty in officially segregated black and
white schools. 15 The criminal cases filed by the Division often involved the
prosecution of those involved in violent retaliation against civil rights
workers or against others who dared to exercise their constitutional
rights.' The issues were clear cut, the wrongs were dramatic, and the
relief needed was simple to formulate. It was an era devoted to the devel-
opment of civil rights precepts.
By the 1970's, however, overt forms of discrimination had been re-
placed in many respects by subtle and sophisticated techniques of discrim-
ination which are often difficult to detect and prove in a court of law. At
the time I headed the Division, employment cases, for example, frequently
involved complex issues such as employee testing practices and affirmative
11. Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (Supp. V 1981)).
12. Until 1972, the EEOC, for example, had no power actually to initiate lawsuits against em-
ployers that it felt had violated Title VII; instead, it was required to refer such matters to the Civil
Rights Division. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat.
103, 105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976)) (authorizing initiation of suits by EEOC). Even
now, however, the Justice Department is the only federal agency empowered by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act to sue employers that are governments, governmental agencies, or political
subdivisions. Id.
13. E.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971) (racial discrimina-
tion in hiring and job assignments); United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers &
Paperworkers, 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968) (racial discrimination in promotions, demotions, and
selection for training).
14. E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (hotel accommodations);
United States v. Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club, 256 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. La. 1966) (dining
facilities).
15. E.g., Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 221 F. Supp. 297 (M.D. Ala. 1963); United States
v. County School Bd., 221 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. Va. 1963).
16. E.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (prosecution for murder of civil rights work-
ers); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (prosecution of individuals for conspiring to intimi-
date blacks who asserted their constitutional rights).
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action requirements.17 Fair housing cases challenged such discriminatory
practices as redlining by mortgage lenders, racial steering and block bust-
ing by realtors, and sex-based credit policies by lenders who instituted
requirements such as demanding that a wife whose income was considered
in a loan application provide information about her intention to have chil-
dren.18 Racial or sexual animus was difficult to prove in these newer
types of civil rights cases. Instead, intentional discrimination often had to
be inferred from such evidence as a discriminatory effect, the lack of a
legitimate purpose, or a departure from the ordinary pattern of activities.
At the same time that our understanding of what constitutes discrimina-
tion expanded, our understanding of who is affected by discrimination also
broadened. We now see that discrimination does not just victimize a single
minority group-blacks. Indeed, it affects women, Hispanics, Native
Americans, Asian Americans, institutionalized persons, and the handi-
capped. The federal government must therefore respond to these groups'
concerns as well, as it has in both Democratic and Republican administra-
tions. For example, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 197619 author-
ized the Civil Rights Division to file suits to combat discriminatory prac-
tices that emerged during the rapid growth of the credit industry. Starting
in 1973, the Division also devoted substantial resources to protecting the
civil rights of Native Americans and to combating various discriminatory
practices directed at Hispanic citizens on account of their ethnic origin or
lack of facility with the English language.20 The newest and most ne-
glected class of victims of unconstitutional practices for whom the Division
has sought meaningful remedies are persons confined in penal facilities21
or in civil institutions for the mentally ill or retarded.22 The Division also
began in the 1970's to litigate issues arising under recent legislation
designed to end discrimination against the handicapped.2"
In addition, enforcement programs are now national in scope. In areas
such as discrimination in places of public accommodation, most litigation
17. E.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding minority set-asides in federal
public works projects); United States v. Jefferson County, Civ. Act. No. 75-P-0666 (N.D. Ala. Aug.
18, 1981) (consent decree covering municipality's complex employment and promotion practices).
18. E.g., Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (redlining);
United States v. Jefferson Mortgage Co., [Laws, Regs., Decisions] EQUAL OPP'TY IN HOUSING REP.
(P-H) 1 19,320 (D.N.J. 1978) (consent decree ending practice of requesting information on birth
control practices and childbearing intentions of female applicants for credit); United States v. Real
Estate One, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (racial steering).
19. Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1982)).
20. E.g., United States v. San Juan County, Civ. Act. No. 79-408JB (D.N.M. 1979) (county
agrees to provide bilingual assistance to Navajo-speaking voters).
21. E.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 553 F. Supp. 567 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
22. E.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (mentally retarded); Rone v. Fire-
man, 473 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (mentally ill).
23. E.g., Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980).
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is still concentrated in the South. But that has not been the case in the
areas of employment, housing, credit, voting, and school desegregation,
where Division litigation by the late 1970's was dispersed throughout the
northern and western states as well. The Division has brought criminal
civil rights prosecutions in all parts of the United States.24 And after pas-
sage of the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act amendments,2" the
Division launched a nationwide program to end employment discrimina-
tion by public employers.
The history of the federal government's participation in the struggle to
combat discrimination teaches us how essential the participation of each
branch of the government is to the enterprise. Without broad congres-
sional authorization to combat discriminatory practices, vigilant executive
enforcement of statutory and constitutional rights, and clear judicial com-
mitment to constitutional ideals, it is impossible to eradicate injustice.
While the Civil Rights Division has never received adequate resources
under any administration to perform all of the enforcement responsibili-
ties it has been given by federal statutes and executive orders, it has grown
substantially over the years. As Judge Norman points out,26 the Civil
Rights Division was not an imposing entity in its early days. For exam-
ple, in 1958 the Civil Rights Division had 15 attorneys and a budget of
$180,000,27 and in 1965 it had 105 attorneys and a budget of just under
$2 million.28 By the time I left the Department, the Division's budget was
approaching $17 million, and the staff exceeded 400 people, about half of
whom were lawyers. Judge Norman has pointed out that when he first
began working at the Civil Rights Division, it was not a bureaucracy. It
has become a bureaucracy. But I am afraid it is a bureaucracy that is not
large enough to do the job. One of the things I hope, in commemorating
the thirtieth anniversary of Brown, is that we all commit ourselves to see-
ing to it that sufficient resources are provided and that officials dedicated
to "aggressive protection" of civil rights are elected or appointed. Only in
that fashion can the Division be expected to carry on a tradition that
started not in 1957, not in 1954, and not in 1939, but in 1883 and before,
when the federal government stood shoulder to shoulder with minorities
and other groups who were seeking their rightful place in our society.
24. During my time at the Division, the Division obtained convictions against individuals in the
states of Washington, Michigan, Utah, and Massachusetts, as well as against individuals in the South.
See 1981 Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 123; 1980 AT'Y GE. ANN. REP. 126-27; 1979 AIr'y GEN. ANN.
REP. 111; 1978 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 134-36.
25. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)).
26. See Norman, The Strange Career of the Civil Rights Division's Comnitment to Brown, 93
YAix- L.J. 983, 983-84 (1984).
27. Telephone interview with John Shaffer, Director, Budget Staff, Justice Management Divi-
sion, Department of Justice (Apr. 20, 1984).
28. Id.
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